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typical of a virtuous character. The thesis that Bolzano anticipates
virtue epistemological considerations is corroborated by his discussion of heuristic principles that set the norms for the acquisition of knowledge. The paper explores possible relations between
such principles and the presumed low-level heuristics of cognitive
processes.
1. THE RATIONAL IDEAL AND THE EPISTEMICALLY REAL
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ABSTRACT: Bernard Bolzano’s philosophy of mind is closely related to his metaphysical conceptions of substance, adherence and
force. Questions as to how the mind is working are treated in
terms of efficient (causal) faculties producing simple and complex representations, conclusive and non-conclusive judgments,
and meta-representational attitudes such as believing and knowing.
My paper outlines the proximity of Bolzano’s account of “mental forces” to contemporary accounts of faculty psychology such as
Modularity Theory and Simple Heuristics. While the modularist
notions of domain specificity and encapsulated mental faculties
align with Bolzano’s allotment of domain specific tasks to correspondingly specified psychological forces (e.g. judging to “judgmental force”, inferring to “inferential force” etc.), the emphasis
of Simple Heuristics on accurate “fast and frugal” processes aligns
with Bolzano’s views regarding cognitive resources and the importance of epistemic economy.
The paper attempts to show how Bolzano’s metaphysics of
mind supposes a conception of bound rationality that determines
his epistemology. Combining the rationalist concern for epistemic
agent responsibility in the pursuit of knowledge with a strong confidence in the reliability of causal processes to generate the right
beliefs, his epistemology shows close affinities with contemporary
Virtue Epistemology. According to Virtue Epistemology, knowledge requires that true beliefs be generated by reliable processes

The rational ideal of knowledge – the central epistemological value –
holds that knowledge of [q] can be ascribed to subject S if 1) the epistemic efforts S made with regard to “q” satisfy the conditions of truthconformity and 2) these efforts and [q]’s being true are connected in
a non-accidental way. Ideally, knowledge should be fully rational, and,
due to its objectively flawless grounds, infallible and indefeasible. Consequently, S’s knowing that [q] requires that S be in a position to assess
the truth-conformity of her judgment (assertion) “q” by evaluating not
only the epistemic reasons leading her to believe that [q], but also the
objective reasons for [q]’s being true. In order to characterize the way in
which we achieve knowledge Bolzano uses the metaphor of an ascent:
after having asserted [q], S comes to know [q] by way of “ascending”
through a flight of “objective grounds” to the ultimate ground of [q].
As it is usually presented – and whether this applies to Bolzano is
precisely what is in question here – ideal knowledge implies that an
epistemic agent S knows [q] when she has fully ascended, that is, when
she has succeeded in flawlessly singling out the right number and order
of pertinent reasons, such that all the steps of ascension are fully transparent to her. And as it is usually presented, ideal knowledge need not
take into consideration pragmatic constraints, or the confinement of the
natural boundaries of the mind. It takes it for granted that a rational
mind operates somehow in an abstract space of logical and semantic
coherence where time restrictions and situational constraints do not affect its work. The epistemic reality, however, looks different. Actual
epistemic agents, though well intentioned and aware of their rational
responsibilities, rarely (if ever) ascend in the ideal straightforward way
from an assertion (belief) “q” through a flight of objective grounds to an
ultimate ground of [q] that would provide the added value of knowledge to their belief “q”. Agent S may indeed start ascending, but she
Vol. 4: 200 Years of Analytical Philosophy
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will typically soon get lost in a host of possible grounds for [q] that
seem equally good or equally wanting when it comes to grounding her
belief that [q]. More often than not, S will feel restrictions of time, of
memory, etc., which make her wonder how she should decide between
the different options that are available to her when it comes to justifying her belief. In the best case, S will arrive at an acceptable level of
grounding for “q”. In the worse scenario, rather than ascending, S actually finds herself descending, doubting now what she asserted before.
When it comes to epistemic reality, it appears that human rationality
is not unbounded rationality, but rather restricted by the limits of its
resources.
Against this background, a number of philosophers claim that human rationality needs to be “naturalized”, that is, accounted for in terms
of reasoning processes that are reliable enough, but also fast and frugal
enough given the demands of a normal human life. It is claimed that
actual minds – being embodied entities – depend on the properties of
the processing systems and the informational resources of their physical
supports. The rational capacities of human minds cannot be construed
in terms of unlimited faculties, but need to be understood as essentially bound. There are two main types of binding factors: rationality is
bound, on the one hand, by the naturally available potential of human
brains and/or neuronal systems, and, on the other hand, by pragmatic
constraints. The label “Naturalized Rationality” literally refers to the
first class of constraints, suggesting that rationality must be assessed
in accordance with the properties of its physical support. Naturalized
Rationality encompasses, however, also considerations that pertain to
the second class of constraints. Among these, research in the field of
what has come to be known as “Simple Heuristics” has been receiving
growing attention. Taking into consideration pragmatic constraints on
rationality, Simple Heuristics deal with the epistemic principles rational
agents apply when they have to decide between [p] or [q] under temporal or other kinds of constraints of urgency. Suppose that S asserts
“q”, where [q] stands for [There is immediate danger for S]. Given the
content of her assertion, S cannot quietly deliberate on the reasons that
warrant her asserting [q] in an idealized rational space. In this emergency situation, rationality requires her to draw on selective principles
that provide the justification needed in a way that is “fast and frugal”
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enough to confront the danger in due time and with proper means.
Throughout their existence, embodied minds find their rationality subject to multiple restrictions that are inflicted on them by the conditions
of their nature. Therefore, it seems appropriate to deflate the notion
of rationality by adapting its conditions of application to the factually
given. In the field of naturalized epistemology, Virtue Epistemology attempts to reconcile an externalist position on justification with internalist normative requirements. The notion of a virtue as a “praiseworthy
personal characteristic” licenses applications both to physical excellence
and skills and also to traits of character. Responsibilist epistemologies
take the virtues relevant to justification to be character traits that subjects bear responsibility for developing. Therefore, failing to display
virtue makes a subject blameworthy, whereas lacking physical excellences and skills does not have the same ethical consequences. Because
they are essentially value-oriented, virtues motivate agents to take certain measures to attune a situation to a given pattern of values. The
methods chosen may be standard or non-standard, driven by norms or
not. Accordingly, an epistemically responsible agent’s path to knowledge is not primarily norm-governed but rather value-driven. According to one account, for instance, it is the virtue of her love of truth that
motivates an agent to apply the most reliable methods in her pursuit
of knowledge, while it is assumed that reliable processes will deliver
results that bear the status of knowledge. For Virtue Epistemologists,
knowledge claims are bound by the cognitive equipment involved in
agent responsibility.
2. THE NATURAL MIND: ‘FACULTY PSYCHOLOGY’

Bolzano’s philosophy of mind is in many ways defined by features similar to those we find in theories that attempt to naturalize rationality and
the mind. In particular, it involves aspects of so called “faculty psychology” as this is found in accounts of Modularity and Simple Heuristics.
Commitments to faculty psychology and bound rationality influence the
position one takes on epistemological questions. For example, they favor reliabilist accounts of knowledge, accounts that are traditionally
opposed to the ideals of rationalist epistemology. In light of his achievements in the development of logical semantics and analytic method-
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ology in philosophy, Bolzano is usually taken to be a full-blown rationalist regarding epistemological requirements. Focusing on his seminal
work on the properties of objective propositions and a variety of logical relations between them, one might too easily think that Bolzano’s
emphasis on, say, “deducibility” implies his commitment to a rationalist
notion of knowledge, understood in terms of perfect deduction. This,
however, is not the case. The tendency in Bolzano’s epistemology is
rather toward naturalizing rationalism, which results in a position that
anticipates contemporary responsibilist reliabilism. This move is not
motivated by a lack of appreciation for the values of rationalism, but
rather by taking into account a metaphysics of the mind that is essentially monistic and that explains mental performances in terms of causal
forces. This “naturalizing” approach to the mind strongly influences
Bolzano’s epistemology, in which he emphasizes the processual aspects
of epistemic states. In his epistemology, Bolzano appears to be a reliabilist who navigates between, on the one hand, absolute reliability
(ideal rationality) instantiated in inferences leading from true premises
to true conclusions connected by relations of logical implication and, on
the other hand, low-level reliability instantiated in processes underlying the spontaneous choice amongst limited options that may draw on
“quick and dirty” heuristic principles (bound rationality). Furthermore,
Bolzano’s epistemological interest is not restricted to the question of the
kind of justifications that make a belief “q” count as knowledge proper,
but focuses also on how to explain the truth of [q] and on how to expand a given body of knowledge. In Bolzano’s approach, matters of justification or warrant imply explanatory and heuristic principles, which
are not independent of the mechanisms steering mental processes.
Mental Modularity is a term introduced by Jerry Fodor who characterizes his book The Modularity of Mind (1983) as “An Essay on Faculty Psychology”. Fodor’s modularism is a theory of the architecture
of the mind, according to which the mind’s cognitive processing is accomplished by a host of functional input-output systems subserving a
central system of reasoning. The processing systems are modular in the
sense that they are domain-specific and work in relative independence
of each other. As regards domain-specificity, the idea of mental modularity corresponds to the traditional idea of the mind being constituted
of different “faculties” each serving to carry out specific tasks. Contem-
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porary modularist accounts view the domain-specificity of modules as
essential to establishing a division of labor that enables embodied systems to efficiently deal with abundant information flows. Fodor claims
that the need for a system to consider any arbitrary item of information in the course of processing would require arbitrarily complex algorithms that risk overburdening the system’s resources. Because they are
not computationally tractable, arbitrary complexity cannot be handled
nor can it be mapped in any model or theory of the mind. Therefore,
mental processes need to be construed in terms of encapsulated units
whose operational range is limited. Encapsulation as the main hallmark of a mental module “concerns the class of representations that
it can use as a resource” once it has been activated by the proprietary
data exhibiting its input-specificity (Samuels 2005, 112). “Paradigmatically, encapsulation concerns the information encoded in memory that
the mechanism is able to consult in the course of providing solutions to
the particular inputs that it receives” (ibid.). The information-frugality
of mental modules is supposed to be supplemented by the processingfrugality of algorithms tailored to the demands of their task-specificity.
Reducing expensive search and assessment procedures, domain specificity and encapsulation enhance fast and mandatory processing. Being
relatively autonomous, mental modules are dissociable and exhibit specific breakdown patterns. Examples of task-domains assigned to distinct
mental modules include the recognition of faces or the representation
of three-dimensional objects.1
Mental modularism ought to be considered against the background
of evolutionary psychology: mental structures and processes are established as a function of low-cost strategies for the system’s resources and
high-yield strategies for its adaptiveness. Accordingly, encapsulation is
considered diachronic in the sense that the informational closure of the
mechanism essentially obtains throughout its entire history. However,
there is also a sense in which encapsulation is synchronic, to wit “if,
at any time, there is at least some (kind of) information possessed by
the organism that is inaccessible to [the mechanism]” (Samuels 2005,
112). The notion of synchronic encapsulation is weaker than that of
diachronic encapsulation and allows counting “any deterministic computational device that does not engage in exhaustive memory search”
as encapsulated. Furthermore, it could even be applied to a reason-
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ing mechanism “whose access to information is mediated via a limited
working memory” (ibid., 113).
This application of the term ‘encapsulation’, although it is not the
one ordinarily used, seems to be at stake in Bolzano’s discussion of the
way in which the requirements of ideal inference collide with the reality of embodied minds. For an inference to be rationally proper it is
required, according to Bolzano, that all the premises needed in order
for a judgment “q” to be conclusive be “present to the mind” in their
entirety at the moment of inferring. However, the mind’s limited capacities for holding actual representations often causes agents to fail to
achieve this ideal. Take the well known example of simple consistencychecking: the task of checking a candidate new belief according to rational requirements demands an epistemic system to consult more information than it can handle in real time. Going through the set of all
stored beliefs in order to determine whether one holds beliefs that contradict the candidate belief is obviously not feasible for human minds.
The amount of time and working memory needed to complete such a
task would go up exponentially with the size of the chosen belief-set.
Besides, inference demands that the agent determine which of the coherent beliefs themselves rest on evidence in order for the candidate
belief to be conclusively supported. Consequently, it might be the case
that, due to limited working memory, either the inference is not implemented – in spite of the agent possessing the substantiating knowledge
in dispositional form – or the inference runs by dint of heuristic rules
that are “quick and dirty” from the point of view of rational ideals (see,
for instance, WL §§300.2; 308).2 While the former option obstructs the
increase of knowledge, the latter concerns the problem of determining
the conditions of warrant for knowledge. The inclusion of more frugal
procedures amongst those capable of supplying credentials for knowledge makes knowledge achievable at the price of increasing fallibility.
“Simple Heuristics” is the fruit of empirical research on the means
people actually use in view of a given epistemic goal. This approach is
based on the idea of replacing “the image of an omniscient mind computing intricate probabilities and utilities” with that of “a bounded mind
reaching into an adaptive toolbox filled with fast and frugal heuristics”.3 This mental “toolbox” is supposed to contain different kinds of
rules, such as search rules, stopping rules or decision rules, which di-
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rect agents in their practical and epistemic endeavors. The somewhat
surprising fact is that these rules – although qualified as “quick and
dirty” in comparison to the traditional principles of rationality – provide
equally satisfying results in almost all experimental settings. Attractive
examples for simple heuristic rules are recognition and satisficing. In
recognition the directive is: select the one you recognize. If people are
asked, for example, to tell which of two cities – say New York or Luzern
– is bigger, their decision usually draws on the name they recognize.
Although this strategy is highly fallible, the success rate is surprisingly
high, even in settings where the decision concerns investment policies.
The expression “satisficing” – a neologism introduced by Herbert Simon
– is used to indicate a strategy that does not involve striving to get
the optimal solution, but, rather, a solution that achieves the intended
goal in a satisfying way. An example of this strategy might be seen in
the choice of a marriage mate: if Maria dreams of marrying George
Clooney, she might never reach her goal of marriage. If she follows the
strategy of satisficing, she will get married as soon as there is a suitable
candidate who resembles George Clooney in a satisfying way. Satisficing is a stopping rule, a rule that prevents agents from getting lost in
extremely complex hosts of possible options. In the practical domain,
satisficing may well have contributed to the survival of our species; in
the epistemic domain it is a strategy that frees reasoning from the potential regress into interminable quests for more and better grounds.
Calling it a strategy does not imply that satisficing is deliberative thinking. Rather, it means that there are specific patterns determining which
values and parameters to incorporate or to disregard in a decision step.
On the other hand, the term ‘strategy’ suggests that these patterns can
be detected and spelled out as explicit rules. The power of strategies
such as satisficing seems to lie, however, precisely in the fact that they
best work on subliminal levels. Satisficing is a strategy that subserves
some of the epistemic directives that Bolzano framed in the Heuristics
of his Theory of Science.
3. THE BOLZANIAN ‘MIND’: SOUL, SUBSTANCE AND FORCE

In Bolzano’s writings there is no clear-cut distinction between the terms
“soul” and “mind”. One way to specify the two notions is to say that
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the soul is clearly characterized as being a substance, while the term
‘mind’ – or, rather, the predicate mental – is used to indicate the main
function of the soul, namely thinking.4 This is not to say that the soul
is nothing but a thinking thing, or that substances that are not souls do
not have the ability to think. Bolzano defines substances as being simple enduring entities that have the force of representation. In Bolzano’s
use, the term “force of representation” subsumes different specific faculties such as the “force of thinking”, the “force of feeling”, the “force of
willing/wanting” and the “force of desiring”.5 This division corresponds
to classical versions of faculty psychology such as Aristotle’s functional
division of the mind, still alive in the contemporary notions of cognitive,
volitive, conative and affective intentional modes. Although Bolzano in
his logical writings uses the more specific notion of a representation as a
non- or sub-propositional part of a proposition, in his metaphysics and
his epistemology “representation” is “the general name for an occurrence (Erscheinung) in our soul/mind (Gemüt).”6 That these two uses
of the expression “representation” – the “objective” and the “subjective” – are not unconnected is apparent in the fact that Bolzano in his
“Theory of Elements” treats objective and subjective representations explicitly “in union”, taking for granted that “both have the same rights
to be accommodated in the teaching of logic”.7 Bolzano does not have
an elaborate theory of the relations between representations generated
by the “force of feeling” or the “force of desiring” and representations
generated by the “force of thinking”. His distinction between representations that are “intuitions” and representations that are “concepts”
implies, however, that he adopts the idea that some kinds of thinking
are non-conceptual. Bolzano’s “intuitions” are defined as conceptually
empty or “naked” representations that are directly caused by their object and determine their reference through the deixis of a demonstrative link. Since thinking – in a minimal sense – is the ability to produce
simple representations, even the occurrence of non-conceptual representations can count as thinking.8 But given this it seems to follow that
all substances are thinking things, since substances are defined as those
simple things that have the force of representation.9
On the other hand, thinking seems to be the central function of those
substances that are souls or minds. Since not all substances are souls
or minds, we are confronted with a more restricted sense of ‘thinking’
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attributable to soul-substances only. Bolzano accounts for the soul in
terms of a substance that is related to other substances in the specific
way of “ruling” over them. In virtue of their intrinsic “forces of attraction”, substances cluster into aggregates in which a certain substance
can become the determining part, due to its stronger attraction forces.
Such a determining or ruling substance within an aggregated complex
of substances is called the “soul” of the complex, while the rest of the
aggregate counts as its “body”. As constituents of a body, the non-ruling
body-substances are rather characterized by functions of “forces of locomotion” and “vital forces”, while the soul-substance in its role as “ruler”
takes the function of the thinking part for the complex.10 In this context,
the term “thinking” is used in a richer sense, referring to the activities
of producing simple and complex representations, as well as conclusive
and non-conclusive judgments. In addition, a soul’s function of thinking
includes self-evaluative activities as exemplified in the cognitive metalevel attitudes of Bolzanian believing and knowing. Keeping in mind
both this rich sense of thinking and the essentially relational nature of
Bolzanian souls, we might define the soul in the following way:
(1)

x is a soul =: x is the thinking thing St in a complex of substances CS constituted by S1 , S2 , . . . Si .

Given that ‘thinking’ means having representations and processing
them in reasoning, this definiens of the concept ‘soul’ maps the conception of the mind in terms of representation and computation that is central in contemporary cognitive science. Paul Thagard, for instance, uses
the shorthand notation CRUM (computational-representational understanding of mind) to express the view that thinking can best be understood in terms of representational structures and computational procedures that operate on those structures (Thagard 1998, 10).
Let me emphasize again that a substance Si will be the dominant or
the thinking part St in a complex of substances making up, for example,
a human being, in virtue of this substance’s relevantly stronger forces.
In Bolzano’s essentially monist understanding of body and soul, it is an
important point that the notion of force accounts for the difference between soul-substances and body-substances. Accordingly, cognitive and
epistemic achievements are accounted for mostly in processual terms
that reflect this understanding of properties as dynamic and efficacious
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entities. Bolzano understands the central elements of his epistemology
in terms of activity and asks: What is going on when agent A is judging
that p? rather than: What is a judgment? This way of proceeding is
in line with the focus on processing and computing in contemporary
cognitive science. It is also in line with the emphasis, in epistemology,
on the dynamics of knowledge acquisition rather than on mere static
conceptions of justification. Such claims are pervasive, for instance,
in Virtue Epistemology where deliberative and reflective processes are
considered to bear epistemic value.11 Bolzano’s strong emphasis on the
ethics of knowledge and virtuous epistemic agency is not unconnected
with his functional metaphysics of the mind, according to which different tasks of mental performance are accomplished by means of taskspecific forces (faculties). Driving the necessary processes, these forces
subserve an epistemically virtuous character in their striving to form
beliefs that attain the status of knowledge. Distinguishing a force of
representing, a force of coming to know, a force of imagining, a force
of remembering, a force of judging, a force of concluding (inferring)
and many other related forces, Bolzano approaches the conception of
an architectural modularity of the mind. A simple act of judging, for
example, is supposed to involve at least three distinct forces:
• Imagining: brings about simple representations;
• Connecting: generates complex representations (non-propositional, propositional);12
• Asserting: enforces the assertion of the propositional complex.
A third feature that connects Bolzano’s account with contemporary theories of the mind consists in the recognition that the limited resources of
mental forces calls for processing rules that combine the epistemically
desirable with the cognitively feasible. This awareness is especially exhibited in Bolzano’s discussion of heuristic principles, a discussion that
combines well with some of the recent results in “Simple Heuristics”
concerning “fast and frugal” processes whose accuracy satisfices epistemological desiderata.
Generally speaking, Bolzano’s metaphysical notion of mental forces
establishes a bridge between the idea of specific task domains and the
idea of processes determined by certain regularities and/or processing

www.thebalticyearbook.org

Naturalized Rationality – a Glance at Bolzano’s Philosophy of Mind

12

rules. In this respect, the metaphysics of mental forces and processing
strongly calls for a reliabilist epistemology, as do the heuristic principles he defends. More specifically, Bolzano’s strong rationalist desideratum allies him with responsibilist versions of reliabilism that emphasize
epistemic agency and responsibility. In my view, Bolzano’s reliabilism
incorporates the following properties:
• On the ‘overt’ epistemic level, heuristic principles guide the acting
of epistemologically responsible agents (rational normativity);
• On a ‘subliminal’ epistemic level, simple heuristic rules determine
the agents’ behavior, warranting its adjustment to the system’s
resources;
• On the physical level, these two-fold heuristics are realized in
causal regularities.
In the following, I shall investigate some principles of Bolzano’s Heuristics in order to support these assumptions.
4. BOLZANO’S HEURISTICS AND RELIABILISM

Bolzano’s epistemology is centered around the concepts of judgment
(Urteil) and cognition (Erkenntnis) – corresponding to the contemporary labels belief and true belief – as well as on the concept of inference. The primary epistemic act is judging, which amounts to asserting
a given proposition, or, in Bolzano’s terms, “taking it for true”. Judging can be either “immediate” or “mediated” by other judgments in an
inferential chain. “Believing” (Glauben) and “knowing” (Wissen), however, are terms that Bolzano applies to second-order states. Bolzanian
believing and knowing are meta-attitudes taken by epistemic agents towards their own judgments (see WL §321).13 They are introduced as attitudes resulting from assessing the truth-conformity of one’s judgments
in terms of their fallibility. While an “immediate” judgment is supposed
to have fallibility 0 – or default infallibility – the fallibility of inferred
judgments depends on the way they were inferred. If the inference was
a “perfect deduction”, starting from correct assertions and following deductive rules properly, the resulting judgment is taken to be infallible.
If, on the other hand, there is uncertainty concerning the correctness of
Vol. 4: 200 Years of Analytical Philosophy
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the premises asserted or proper rule following, the inferred judgment is
taken to be fallible.14 Consequently, the reflexive attitude towards such
a judgment is Bolzanian believing, while Bolzanian knowing reflects the
assessment of one’s judgment as infallible:
(2)

A knows that q iff A asserts “q” & A truly evaluates her asserting
“q” as infallible.

(3)

A believes that q iff A asserts “q” & A evaluates her asserting “q”
as fallible.

From this perspective, it seems as if the assessment of truth-conformity
in one’s judgments were driven by reasons of justification only. This is
not the case however, at least not in Bolzano’s approach, which takes
the desire for insight, understanding and explanation to be the engine
of one’s search for an assertion’s objective grounds. The aim to increase
knowledge widens the scope of the search for justification to include
the search for the objective grounds of the propositions asserted. It is
this explanatory endeavor that plays the constitutive role in Bolzano’s
conception of knowledge, and it is this explanatory endeavor that requires methods that do not grant infallibility. The epistemic principles
set out in the “Heuristics” section of the Theory of Science include inductive and abductive reasoning, both being roads to knowledge that
are considered “inverted” – compared to the “natural” road of proper
deduction – and “amiss” in that they involve “haphazardness” and favor
“serendipity” (WL §330). But Bolzano is confident that the potential
of fallibility inherent in our methods of explanation will not result in
a substantial faultiness of judgment or the impossibility of knowledge.
If an agent’s primary aim is to achieve truth-conformity, this aim will
motivate her to assume her epistemic responsibilities and to cultivate
the virtues required to achieve the best available results.
Bolzano’s epistemology and heuristic is pragmatic insofar as it never
loses sight of the fact that epistemic agents are embodied minds, bound
by their natural resources. If “ascending to the grounds” of a given
truth [q] is striving for its best explanation among possible competing options, this task requires abilities such as inventive talent, delight
in exploration, patience, perseverance, humility and so on, that reach
beyond the steadiness of strictly applying logical rules. These epistemic virtues are faculties by means of which actual epistemic agents
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assume their epistemic responsibility in real time conditions while forcing the rational ideal of knowledge to adapt to its epistemic reality.
Bolzano’s “Heuristics” provides a collection of rules for one’s “behavior in thinking”, amongst which figures, for example, the principle of
“tentative supposition” also called the “indirect method” (rule no. 5,
WL §329). This rule resumes the hypothetical method of “attempting
to find truths by means of something that is not yet known to be true”
(WL §329.1). Due to the involvement of the unknown in the process
of explaining and coming to know a given truth [q], the hypothetical
method seems “artificial” and “inverted” or “indirect”, compared to the
“natural” method of deducing truth from known truths. Nevertheless,
given the poverty of the natural method with regard to knowledge extension, epistemic virtue requires resorting to the hypothetical method,
although it is “amiss” in that it involves “haphazardness” and favors
“serendipity”. Successfully extending knowledge depends on mastering the art of combining both “natural” and “inverted” methods in a
maximally beneficial way, an art that is highly determined by epistemic
skills and virtues. Bolzano emphasizes that the faultiness inherent in
the application of the hypothetical method is minimized when tentative
suppositions are chosen “with proper skillfulness” and their examination is performed “in all ways available to us” (WL §329.2). Epistemic
skillfulness manifests itself in an agent’s selecting propositions that are
potentially expedient as hypothetical grounds for a given statement.
“Proper skills” for this task may evaluate the probability of the candidate propositions, their simplicity or their convenience for experiments
with regard to the statement to be grounded and the circumstances
of investigation. Within the set of selected propositions, they can further establish a hierarchy that determines the order of examination (WL
§329.3). The soundness of the potential explanans might be examined
progressively by checking the truth-values of propositions entailed by
it, or again regressively by applying the hypothetical method to the hypothetical grounds themselves. For general statements, induction is another appropriate method of examination that implies various epistemic
and experiential skills (WL §329.8). Sometimes, so Bolzano claims, it
may even suffice to “think” the proposition to be examined “as clearly as
possible”, including representing it “in words or signs of another kind”.
This may lead us to “see” its evidence or to remember other occasions
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when we already considered its truth or falsity. Bolzano does not exclude subjective evidence as a relevant factor for truth-conduciveness;
rather he shows that epistemically virtuous agents will not unconditionally rely upon it.
It is clear that the successful application of the skills mentioned
draws on processes and mechanisms that are not subject to willful control and, therefore, do not properly fall in the scope of agentive responsibility. It seems, however, plausible to assume that such processes and
mechanisms are not unrelated to certain normative attitudes an agent
holds. Consider, for example, stopping rules such as are exemplified in
the satisficing strategies revealed in Simple Heuristics research. Generally, rules of this kind operate on subliminal levels. They are not explicit
directives of epistemic acting, although they can be spelled out and used
as explicit directives. Agents might be surprised to learn that they acted
on these principles when they came to believe a certain proposition [q].
Within a merely process reliabilist epistemology, however, such agents
could be properly said to know [q], since their belief was produced by
a sufficiently reliable process. In contrast, responsibilist reliabilism defends the rationalist claim according to which attributions of knowledge
require the subject of knowledge to be an agent, presupposing that she
is aware of her practicing epistemic activity and consciously following
patterns and rules directing such activities. In this perspective, success and failure to achieve the goal of knowledge are not simply due
to the external fact that certain mechanisms functioned well or broke
down and disturbed the reliability of the processes liable for knowledge
achievement. Rather, achievement of knowledge as well as shortcomings with regard to this aim focus on the agent’s responsibility to use
epistemic skills properly, that is, in accordance with rational norms and
rules. Therefore, the relation between agent responsibility and the reliability of knowledge-conducive processes is accounted for in terms of
motivational force. Consider, for example, the following account:
Epistemic behavior motivated by the motive for truth has
value in addition to the value of the truth that is thereby
attained. Success in reaching truth [. . . ] is not guaranteed
[. . . ], but I assume that when it is attained, the behavior
that is successful in attaining it gains value that it would not
otherwise have. [. . . ] Reliabilists are right to focus on reli-

www.thebalticyearbook.org

Naturalized Rationality – a Glance at Bolzano’s Philosophy of Mind

16

ability as a critical feature of the relation between believers
and truth, but they are wrong if they think it is constitutive
of that relation. [. . . ] If I am right that the value of knowledge in addition to truth is that the truth is reached because
of the motive for truth and reliable cognitive behavior, then
there is a definitional connection between the two values as
well (Zagzebski 2000, 120f).
Similar ideas on how to relate process reliabilist considerations with the
rationalist intuition that agentive responsibility is constitutive to knowledge are found in John Greco’s account of knowledge as “credit for true
belief” (Greco 2003). What seems important in these accounts is that
they meet the intuition that sound rational requirements for knowledge
need to be reconciled with the kind of rationality proper to those epistemic agents we are acquainted with: human beings. In this respect it is
worth noting that Bolzano’s metaphysical claims are bound to conceptual rigidity. Substances and their faculties are subject to identical constraints in all possible worlds. There is no world conceivable in which a
soul- or mind-substance could overstep its natural boundaries. Any conception of minds constituted differently must clash with the concept of
substances and their forces, and is, therefore, not about real entities.15
Within the framework of a naturalized conception of the mind, natural mechanisms and processes must play a decisive role in epistemic
achievement. On the other hand, rationality requires accounting for
knowledge in terms of justification and explanation; both of them are
bound to operate according to logical and semantic laws. Bolzano’s
heuristic rules point to the way in which agents ‘translate’ the normative requirements of rationality into viable pragmatics, making use of
the resources available in the processing system upon which their rationality relies. Applying heuristic principles as epistemic guidelines
involves various decisions that seem to evoke regress problems: In order to decide which supposition is worth being considered, or on whose
judgments one should rely or in what circumstances experience may
provide valuable reasons, more and finer grained rules and principles
are needed. This conflates the epistemic task in a way that cannot be
managed at the level of awareness. Consider, for example, the rule stating that judgments shall be tested only in cases in which “we see that
a test is possible without assuming propositions that have less reliabil-
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ity than [these judgements] have themselves” (WL §332.7) If the latter
is the case, we could at best corroborate the tested judgments but not
refute them. Hence, if their eligible reasons are less reliable propositions, we can “confidently desist from such testing” (idem). This rule
strongly relies on features of the logical relations between propositions,
famously laid open in the Bolzanian conceptions of “probability”, “deducibility”, and “ground-consequence”.16 From a logical or ideally rational point of view it is obvious that a proposition [q] whose probability
is P < 1 cannot gain a higher probability if the proof for [q] consists
in propositions whose probability is P’ < P. The question, then, is how
we can “see” the degrees of propositional probability that are relevant
to reasoning. Admittedly, in many cases, evaluation of higher or lesser
probability will be a matter of estimation and depends on decisions
contingent on an agent’s experience. Following the rules commanded
by rationality involves specific evaluative agentive faculties, comparable to those by which artists apply the appropriate brushstroke or fit in
the right word, or those by which wise people are aware of where to
initiate or to stop certain efforts. Demonstrating such faculties belongs
more to the domain of habitual behavior than to the domain of willful
action. It is typical for this kind of behavior that it cannot be explained
by indicating the criteria in virtue of which the decision was reached,
although it bears on reliable mechanisms and is successful in achieving
the intended aim.
On the overt level of their epistemic activity responsible agents attempt to apply rules and principles commanded by laws of logic and
rationality. In doing this, they use methods and skills instructed by their
epistemic experience. These methods and skills are operational mainly
on a subliminal level. Responsibilist reliabilism claims that epistemic
agents mobilize, so to say, their computational and creative resources
in order to assume their responsibility towards rationality. Their endeavor in the pursuit of this aim and their diligence in attempting to
apply their skills in the best possible way entitles them to regard their
asserted beliefs as knowledge.17 The added value of knowledge over
true belief does not rest, in the first place, on the reliability of the truthconducive processes but on the satisfaction of the agent’s motivation to
use them in a responsible way that is committed to the values of truth
and goodness. If her love of truth motivates an agent to resort to her
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best means to reach the aim of judgments conforming to truth, it will
explain why her judgments are produced by reliable processes and give
them the commendation of knowledge.
Bolzano’s epistemology ranges over his logics and his metaphysics of
the mind, reconciling rational requirements with the demands of physically constituted natural minds. His notion of knowledge allows for
ways of evaluating truth-conduciveness that overcome the problem of
regress of justificatory belief without resorting, however, to a category
of foundational belief. An important category with respect to valuable
epistemic evaluation is affectivity. Bolzano defends the idea of a “feeling
for truth” and he claims that the concept of such a feeling is “indispensable for logic and many another science” (WL §316, Note 1).
Moreover, he grants trust and trustworthiness a most prominent
place: he not only develops a notion of “confidence” (Zuversicht) that
allows him to define a specific relational property of subjective propositions, but also encourages epistemic agents to trust their own epistemic
faculties and those of others. It is not surprising, then, that consulting
the judgments of others as well as experience figures in his “Heuristics”
as rule no. 7 (WL §331). Heuristic rule no. 7 suggests that an important factor in making proper decisions regarding the ways and length
of explanatory investigation is the experience from shared epistemic
practices. Under the concept of “common sense” (gemeiner Menschenverstand), Bolzano subsumes performances of consensus and common
semiotic systems that bottom out in trustworthy evaluations of judgments and explanations. One manifestation of “common sense” is consensus, considered by Bolzano as “a particular indicator of a judgment’s
truth”, especially when “the proposition itself is not doubted in spite
of dissent about its ground” (WL §315.6). The claim that a consensual assertion “q” indicates its truth-conformity is admittedly pregnant
in those cases where the reasons given for an assertion are not only different but also conflicting. Cases of convergence in judgment in spite of
diverging reasons seem to be paradigmatic of the need to search for the
best explanation of the asserted truth. Insofar, reliance on consensus
is not just the naïve “faith of optimists” or the contingent “fashion” of
a “party spirit”. Rather, Bolzano’s inclusion of consensus in matters of
epistemic evaluation and warrant seems to make use of ideas that are
similar to those worked out in the Lehrer-Wagner model of consensual
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trust, which depicts a structure of mutual trust and trustworthiness. In
Keith Lehrer’s approach to trust, the interrelations between trustworthiness, self-trust and mutual trust are supposed to play a key role in
accounting for reason and its involvement of individual and collective
factors, as well as for epistemological concerns.18
Investigating Bolzano’s epistemology and Heuristics, we will not
find a precept for a hierarchal order of truth-conducive methods. Rather,
there is strong emphasis that we should never insist on having infallible
access to knowledge, counterbalanced by the equally strong emphasis
that we have excellent reasons to trust our epistemic evaluations. That
the weights of these axes properly adjust is due to the desire or love
of truth on which they turn. If this value-directed attitude is missing,
epistemically relevant processes are not backed by a motivation that
guarantees the agent responsibility appropriate to reason. The frame of
Bolzano’s logic and naturalist metaphysics of the mind allows – or even
presupposes – that processes on a subliminal epistemic level essentially
contribute to satisfying the rationality constraints on knowledge. They
warrant, on the one hand, the rationality of the decisions taken in the
ascending procedure, and, on the other hand, the adjustment of the
procedure to the system’s resources.
Notes
1
The short overview on modularity theory laid out here is strongly committed to
Samuels 2005 and Carruthers 2006. I would like to thank an anonymous referee whose
substantial remarks made me improve this part.
2
I will use the code ‘WL’ to refer to Bolzano’s Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre).
There are two partial English translations of the Wissenschaftslehre, both of them titled
Theory of Science (1972. R. George (transl. and ed.). Berkeley & Los Angeles: University
of California Press; 1973. J. Berg (transl. and ed.) Dordrecht & Boston: D. Reidel). Since
a part of the passages I refer to are not translated in either of these books, I mention only
the original Wissenschaftslehre (WL).
3
Gigerenzer & Todd 1999.
4
“Bolzano uses ‘mind’ (or ‘spirit’ [Geist]) to refer to souls that are rational” (Chisholm
1991, 208).
5
Bolzano 1834, §75.2; Bolzano 1851, §51.
6
WL §48.3
7
WL §48.1
8
“Bolzano’s use of the term ‘Gedanke’ is vastly different from Frege’s. Bolzano applies
it to mental events which are either judgings or subjective ideas” (Künne 1997, 207).
9
“What is required, logically, if an individual thing is eligible to have a conscious prop-
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erty? And the answer is that very little is required [. . . ]. It would be logically possible for
a conscious property to be exemplified even if there were only one individual substance”
(Chisholm 1991, 209f).
10
“The mental substances are identified with the ruling substances and the living substances with the organic wholes” (Berg 1976, 32 (author’s translation)).
11
“But there are other epistemic evaluations that are not static. We evaluate and regulate activities of inquiry and deliberation. I shall assume that inquiries (and deliberations)
are goal-directed activities, attempts to find things out. These activities can be carried out
well or poorly; and many important epistemic norms are concerned with how we should
carry out activities of this kind. How reflective should we be when we carry out inquiries
and deliberations? What form should our monitoring reflections take? What role have the
concepts of knowledge and justification in the ways in which we regulate our inquiries?”
(Hookway 2003, 193f).
12
Bolzano assumes the existence of some unnamed forces such as an “activity of our
mind – namely connecting – that is essentially distinct from the one that generates any
simple concept”, which accounts for the producing of “complex concepts” (WL §287.8).
13
“Some philosophers [. . . ] may hold that ‘knows’ is a very specialized term of epistemic appraisal, with a role, perhaps, in identifying informants or reliable sources of
testimony” (Hookway 2003, 201).
14
Bolzano defines doubt in terms of degrees of probability of confidence, and confidence as indicating either immediacy of judgment or the truth-probability of a conclusive
proposition [q] in relation to a set of premises.
15
An exception might be seen in what Bolzano calls the “unconditional substance”,
God. Epistemically, the unconditional substance has the advantage of unlimited storing capacities for propositions and is not subject to time and urgency constraints. The
unconditional substance is the ideal rational agent in that it not only knows all truths
immediately, but also has the ability of indicating their grounds in ideally desirable completeness. The question is whether the notion of an unconditional substance is a coherent
one.
16
For details on these relations see Sebestik 1992, 1999; Siebel 1996; Tatzel 2002.
17
“How observant I am will influence whether relevant evidence grabs my attention;
and how intellectually honest I am will influence whether I generally come to doubt
propositions once presented with sufficient counter-evidence to them. [. . . ] If we possess
virtue, and we are confident that we possess virtue, the fact that various reflective questions are not raised can be seen as a symptom of our rationality rather than as a sign of
our reluctance to do what epistemic responsibility requires” (Hookway 2003, 200f).
18
Lehrer 2001, 1997 (see chapters 1, 3, 6).
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